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Abstract To detect erroneous action outcomes is neces-
sary for flexible adjustments and therefore a prerequisite of
adaptive, goal-directed behavior. While performance
monitoring has been studied intensively over two decades
and a vast amount of knowledge on its functional neuro-
anatomy has been gathered, much less is known about
conscious error perception, often referred to as error
awareness. Here, we review and discuss the conditions
under which error awareness occurs, its neural correlates
and underlying functional neuroanatomy. We focus spe-
cifically on the anterior insula, which has been shown to be
(a) reliably activated during performance monitoring and
(b) modulated by error awareness. Anterior insular activity
appears to be closely related to autonomic responses
associated with consciously perceived errors, although the
causality and directions of these relationships still needs to
be unraveled. We discuss the role of the anterior insula in
generating versus perceiving autonomic responses and as a
key player in balancing effortful task-related and resting-
state activity. We suggest that errors elicit reactions highly
reminiscent of an orienting response and may thus induce
the autonomic arousal needed to recruit the required mental
and physical resources. We discuss the role of norepi-
nephrine activity in eliciting sufficiently strong central and
autonomic nervous responses enabling the necessary
adaptation as well as conscious error perception.
Keywords Performance monitoring  Error awareness 
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Introduction
Performance monitoring, i.e., the ability to monitor one’s
own mistakes and to implement appropriate behavioral
adjustments, has been intensively studied over the last two
decades. A topic that has moved into the focus of research
much more recently is conscious perception of errors. Why
do we consciously detect some errors while others escape
our attention? Which of the brain structures identified to
contribute to performance monitoring are relevant for the
awareness that an error has been made? Why are we able to
consciously perceive almost all errors in certain tasks,
while in other tasks more than 50% of the errors remain
unnoticed? Here, we review the current knowledge on
conscious perception of errors. For the sake of brevity, we
will henceforth call conscious error perception ‘‘error
awareness’’ and, accordingly, the failure to perceive errors
‘‘error blindness’’.
After a brief introduction to the neural correlates of
performance monitoring in general, we will elaborate on
the methods of measuring error awareness and discuss the
conditions under which subjects may become aware or
remain unaware of an error. This will be followed by
overviews of correlates of error awareness in the central
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nervous system (CNS) and autonomic nervous system
(ANS), respectively. In a further section, we discuss the
putative role of the neuromodulator norepinephrine (NE) in
driving post-error brain and ANS responses. As the anterior
insular cortex (AIC) appears to be particularly relevant for
error awareness, this review will focus on the role of this
cortical area in performance monitoring and its potential
links to accompanying autonomic responses. In the sub-
sequent sections, we hypothesize that errors are salient
events eliciting an orienting response and activating a
‘‘salience network’’ centered around the AIC. We propose
that the orienting/salience response in the AIC and asso-
ciated areas enable flexible recruitment of resources to
react to any upcoming problem in task performance. A
sufficiently strong orienting response appears to be asso-
ciated with error awareness, but the direction of causality
between central and autonomic responses and awareness
remain to be determined. We will conclude with a number
of open questions and suggest approaches to address them
in future research.
Correlates of performance monitoring
In speeded choice reaction time tasks, errors are typically
associated with a specific event-related brain potential
(ERP) signature, consisting of the error-related negativity
(ERN, also error negativity, Ne) and the error positivity
(Pe) (Falkenstein et al. 1990; Gehring et al. 1993; Over-
beek et al. 2005). The ERN reaches its peak around
50–100 ms after erroneous actions and has a frontocentral
distribution over the scalp. Source localization studies as
well as single-trial EEG-informed functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) suggest it to be generated in the
posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC), in particular in the
rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) (Dehaene et al. 1994; Debener
et al. 2005). The RCZ is the putative homologue of the
monkey’s rostral and dorsal cingulate motor areas (Picard
and Strick 2001) and is roughly equivalent to the midcin-
gulate cortex according to Brent Vogt’s terminology (Vogt
et al. 2004). In line with the EEG findings, neuroimaging
studies consistently implicate the RCZ in performance
monitoring (Ridderinkhof et al. 2004; Taylor et al. 2007).
A currently predominating view on the function of the
pMFC is that it is engaged in monitoring situations when
the action outcome is worse than expected or when the
outcome is at risk, and in signaling the need for adjustment
(Ridderinkhof et al. 2004).
After the ERN, at a latency of about 300–500 ms, the
more centroparietally distributed Pe occurs. While it seems
to share morphological, topographical, temporal, and
functional features with the P300 (P3b) component, its
functional significance and its generators are far from clear.
Interestingly, it seems to be most consistently modulated
by awareness (Overbeek et al. 2005) and motivational
salience of errors (Ridderinkhof et al. 2009), which will be
discussed in more detail below (Fig. 1).
In addition to the RCZ, the anterior insula is consistently
activated during errors and other instances when perfor-
mance monitoring becomes necessary (Klein et al. 2007).
Fig. 1 Correlation of error
positivity (Pe) and P3b,
suggestive of a common
functional significance in terms
of orienting to salient events
(adapted from Ridderinkhof
et al. 2009). In an oddball task,
infrequent target stimuli trigger
an orienting response reflected
in the P3b. The orienting
response is most evident in the
effect of the interval between
successive targets (expressed in
terms of the number of
intermittent nontargets) on P3b
amplitude. Individual
differences in this effect of
target–target–interval (TTI) on
the P3b amplitude were found to
co-vary (r = 0.47) with
individual differences in the
amplitude of the Pe obtained
from erroneous responses in a
Simon task
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Here, we further broke down the metaanalysis using acti-
vation likelihood estimates (Turkeltaub et al. 2002) pre-
sented by Klein et al. (2007) according to the different
conditions of performance monitoring. This metaanalysis
included 55 functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
studies on performance monitoring. Here, we focus par-
ticularly on the anterior insula, which—similar to the
pMFC—was activated during all studied conditions calling
for adjustments, specifically pre-response conflict, decision
uncertainty, response errors, and negative feedback
(Fig. 2). Pre-response conflict arises when several com-
peting response tendencies are elicited by a task (Yeung
et al. 2004); decision uncertainty refers to underdetermined
responding in situations when information about the cor-
rect response is insufficient (Botvinick et al. 2001; Volz
et al. 2003; Dayan and Yu 2006). Pre-response conflict and
uncertainty both indicate an increased likelihood to fail,
which can still be countermanded by quickly recruiting
additional control processes (solving the conflict or gath-
ering the necessary information to reduce uncertainty).
Errors and negative feedback occur after the response and
call for remedial actions compensating the failure and/or
subsequent adjustments improving future performance
(Ridderinkhof et al. 2004; Ullsperger et al. 2004). In the
metaanalysis, interesting differences are visible: pre-
response conditions activate predominantly the superior
AIC, whereas post-response conditions (errors and negative
feedback) seem to activate the AIC to a larger extent with
maxima in the inferior AIC (Table 1). Moreover, in post-
response conditions, activity in the right AIC is larger then
in the left AIC. In contrast, pre-response conflict seems not
to activate the right AIC significantly. Note that by far most
studies included in the metaanalysis studied pre-response
conflict, such that this null finding is unlikely to result from
insufficient power. In any case, similarly as in the pMFC
(Ullsperger and von Cramon 2001; Garavan et al. 2003;
Rushworth et al. 2004; Nachev et al. 2005) there seems to
be a functional gradient in the localization of activity
within the AIC. Interestingly, this subregional differentia-
tion is highly reminiscent of the findings on risk processing
(Preuschoff et al. 2008; Bossaerts 2010, this issue). Pre-
response risk anticipation preferentially involves the
superior AIC, whereas (post-response or post-feedback)
risk prediction errors involve the inferior AIC. Similarly as
Fig. 2 Results of metaanalysis performed separately for pre-response
conflict (PRC), decision uncertainty (DU), response errors (RE), and
negative feedback (NF), projected on coronal, right sagittal, and axial
slices. Alpha level = 0.01. L/R left/right, pMFC posterior medial
frontal cortex
Table 1 Significant activation
likelihood maxima in the
anterior insular cortex resulting
from the metaanalysis at an




L/R left/right, N number of
studies included in metaanalysis
Condition N Side Talairach coordinates Volume (mm3)
x y z
Pre-response conflict 28 L -35 15 6 351
R – – – –
Decision uncertainty 6 L -29 21 3 162
R 34 21 6 513
Response errors 19 L -32 15 3 405
R 34 15 -9 1,377
Negative feedback 9 L -38 15 -6 108
R 34 18 -6 756
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in the performance monitoring conditions investigated in
the metaanalysis, pre- and post-response risk processing
would call for different adjustments. The different subre-
gions of the AIC may play a role in recruiting the necessary
effort to avoid (superior AIC: risk prediction, increased
likelihood to fail) and compensate (inferior AIC: risk pre-
diction error, negative reward prediction error) potential
risks and failure. These findings and our resulting specu-
lations strongly call for further fine-grained research on the
functional topography within the AIC.
How to study error awareness?
Error signaling and retrospective accuracy judgement
Up to now, error awareness has been studied by asking
participants whether they noticed that they had made an
error. Classically, participants are instructed to signal
errors by pressing an ‘‘error signaling button’’ (which
usually is not used for the primary task) when they
encountered an error (Rabbitt 1968, 2002; Nieuwenhuis
et al. 2001). An error reported correctly by pressing this
signaling button is considered consciously perceived
(‘‘aware error’’), whereas an error not followed by a sig-
naling response is considered unnoticed (‘‘unaware error’’).
Notably, error correction responses (i.e., pressing the cor-
rect response immediately after the error) have no such
indicative value as they do not necessarily require error
awareness; they can occur even in the absence of error
monitoring (Ullsperger and von Cramon 2006).
The classical method of error signaling has some limi-
tations that need to be considered. It may well be that
participants become aware of an error despite not having
signaled it. For example, under time pressure induced by
short inter-trial intervals they may consider it more
important to concentrate on the upcoming trial than on
error signaling. In a number of pilot studies participants
reported that they became aware of errors but felt that they
had no time to signal them (Danielmeier, Wessel, Ull-
sperger; unpublished observations). Furthermore, error
signaling may be influenced by response bias depending on
motivational and other factors. In a few studies, some of
these limitations have been circumvented by asking par-
ticipants to evaluate each button press by indicating whe-
ther the preceding response to the primary task was deemed
correct or incorrect instead of merely signaling erroneous
responses (Endrass et al. 2007; Klein et al. 2007; Wessel
et al. 2010). However, any kind of signaling or perfor-
mance classification response may interfere with trial-
by-trial post-error adjustments. Finally, the signaling or
performance classification response may be erroneous due
to motor action slips. Thus, currently there is no optimal
way of studying error awareness (a) as it is difficult to elicit
optimal numbers of aware and unaware errors and (b)
awareness is generally not measurable directly but only by
introspection. The precision of assessing error awareness
and error blindness could be improved by post-decision
wagering procedures that have been used successfully to
assess other kinds of awareness (Persaud et al. 2007). Here,
participants are offered cash rewards for revealing con-
scious knowledge. After determining whether a response
was correct or incorrect, they should make a bet of either a
small or large amount of money on the accuracy judgment.
This method as well as application of signal detection
theory has great potential to reveal error blindness and may
thus be helpful in future studies on error awareness.
Tasks associated with error blindness
In speeded forced manual choice tasks usually applied to
study performance monitoring, for example, the Eriksen
flanker task (Eriksen and Eriksen 1974), Simon task
(Simon and Rudell 1967) and Go/NoGo tasks, most errors
result from premature responding prior to completion of
stimulus evaluation such that prepotent but incorrect
reactions are issued. As stimulus evaluation continues after
the response the information necessary to detect errors
becomes available very soon (Coles et al. 2001). Therefore,
almost all errors are signaled by the subjects preventing a
comparison with errors that were missed (Ullsperger and
von Cramon 2006; Maier et al. 2008), rendering these tasks
poorly suited for the study of error awareness.
Figure 3a shows a schematic of the timing of different
events and processes ongoing during erroneous trials and
factors that may modulate error awareness at different
stages. Early indicators of error processing such as the
ERN are based on quickly available information [be it
coded as post-response conflict (Yeung et al. 2004), as
mismatch between efference copy and evolving correct
response tendency (Coles et al. 2001) or as a reinforcement
learning (reward prediction error) signal (Holroyd and
Coles 2002)] and do not require other inputs such as pro-
prioceptive feedback (Allain et al. 2004) or redundant
sensory feedback (De Bruijn et al. 2004; Gentsch et al.
2009). In contrast, awareness about the error does not need
to occur immediately. It is likely to instantiate when
cumulating evidence about erroneous behavior exceeds
some threshold and activates sufficiently large neural net-
works (Dehaene et al. 2006). In other words, a compound
internal error signal based on numerous sources of infor-
mation needs to become sufficiently strong compared to
noise and counterevidence coded in the brain. Thus, error
awareness can arise from later events, such as proprio-
ceptive feedback from the erroneous action, sensory input
(e.g., the ‘‘click’’ feeling and sound elicited by pressing the
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response button), and—as will be discussed below—from
interoception of autonomic responses accompanying the
error. Steinhauser et al. (2008) showed empirically and by
computational modeling that in a flanker task the latency of
the error signaling response (as an indicator of error
awareness) is strongly influenced by the correct(ive)
response tendency. In their model, post-response conflict is
the major source of information inducing error detection
(Yeung et al. 2004; Steinhauser et al. 2008). As tasks used
to study error awareness (described in detail below) differ
considerably from the flanker task with respect to stimulus
uncertainty, task complexity, and availability of efference
copy and proprioceptive feedback, other sources of infor-
mation may be more important for error awareness in those
cases.
Thus, theoretically, influences at many stages of infor-
mation processing may influence whether an error enters
awareness or not. This may start at the level of stimulus
presentation and perception (Fig. 3a, arrow 1). In some
experiments, stimulus detectability was modulated by
increasing perceptual difficulty (Scheffers and Coles 2000;
Oliveira et al. 2007) or masking (Maier et al. 2008; Cohen
et al. 2009). Also fluctuations in ongoing brain activity may
influence stimulus perception and thus task performance
(Boly et al. 2007; Sadaghiani et al. 2009). In addition, quite
trivially, eye blinks in tasks with very short stimulus pre-
sentation may prevent the necessary input on some trials.
All these conditions have in common is that the high
uncertainty about the stimuli results in underdetermined



























cumulating evidence about erroneous behavior ?
b
Fig. 3 Schematic of timing and interaction of processes during an
erroneous trial that may support error awareness. a Timing of external
and internal events as well as psychophysiological measures associ-
ated with the accumulation of evidence that the response was
erroneous (not to scale). The latency of conscious error perception
may vary substantially and should result from accumulation of
sufficient evidence that an error has occurred, independent of the
source of information which may range from early pMFC-mediated
error monitoring via proprioceptive and sensory input discordant with
expectancies from forward modeling to interoception. The numbered
arrows indicate different influences that may lead to error blindness:
1 ambiguous stimuli make it objectively impossible to detect errors.
Also fluctuations in attention or eye blinks precluding the perception
of short stimuli may result in errors that cannot be detected reliably.
2 failure to represent task sets or to activate complex task rules may
lead to errors. 3 insufficient efference copy, proprioceptive feedback
or sensory input on action effects may hinder conscious perception of
an error. 4 interactions with ongoing fluctuations in brain activity may
lower signal-to-noise ratio in the representation of accumulating
evidence of erroneous behavior. Moreover, action slips in the
signaling or accuracy classification response may occur. b Influence
of accumulating evidence of an error on different processes and
correlates during error monitoring. It is unclear whether processes are
working in serial or—at least partly—parallel fashion and how much
they depend on each other. In particular the causal relationship of
error awareness, some post-error adjustments and autonomic
responses is still unclear
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brain has no chance to detect the error. In other words,
while the subject may become aware of the high uncer-
tainty, she/he cannot determine the valence of the response
reliably but must guess and wait for external feedback
(which, by itself, may induce error awareness at a later
stage, of course). Hence, studies using masking or
degradation of stimuli need to ensure that the dependent
variables are deconfounded from the accompanying
uncertainty.
If task representations are weak, this may also lead to
errors as well as reduced error awareness. A number of
studies on error awareness made use of a Go/NoGo task
in which subjects were instructed to withhold their
response in two different conditions (Hester et al. 2005;
O’Connell et al. 2007; Shalgi et al. 2007, 2009; O’Con-
nell et al. 2009b). For example, Stroop-like stimuli were
presented (color words in colored ink). Each stimulus
should be responded to, except for repetitions of the same
stimulus or incongruent stimulus configurations (e.g.,
when the color of the ink differs from the meaning of the
presented word). This task, termed error-awareness task
(EAT) by Hester and colleagues, has proven to yield
sufficiently large numbers of both perceived and unper-
ceived errors. It seems conceivable that subjects do not
keep both task instructions in mind with equal strength,
which may produce slips due to ‘‘forgetting’’ of the rel-
evant rule. It might be speculated that lapses in retrieval
of one of the two rules may be the reason of the high
number of errors remaining unconscious. However, as
total number and error awareness seem to be dissociated
between the two NoGo conditions (O’Connell et al.
2007), the sources of information inducing error aware-
ness as well as the sources of errors may differ between
the two conditions (O’Connell et al. 2009a).
The first study explicitly addressing error awareness
made use of an oculomotor task (Nieuwenhuis et al.
2001) and inspired a number of follow-up studies using
this effector modality (Endrass et al. 2005, 2007; Klein
et al. 2007; Harsay et al. 2010; Wessel et al. 2010). In an
antisaccade task (AST) in which subjects are instructed to
shift their gaze in the direction opposite to a briefly dis-
played peripheral cue, erroneous saccades occur when
subjects look initially in the direction of the peripheral
cue before redirecting their gaze to the correct, opposing
side of the screen. These erroneous prosaccades remain
unconscious in about 50% of the cases. The reason might
be that gaze changes differ in their control as well as
proprioceptive and sensory feedback quite significantly
from manual responses. In addition, untrained subjects are
not familiar with using gaze as a response effector. It is
therefore conceivable that information sources such as
efference copy and proprioception have less access to the
general goal-oriented performance monitoring system
(Fig. 3a, arrow 3).1 Notably, visual input is not processed
during saccades. Compared to the broad range of infor-
mation on a manual error, brief errors in eye motion (i.e.,
a prosaccade usually immediately followed by a correc-
tive antisaccade) seem to be much less detectable.
Central nervous correlates of error awareness
In the seminal study by Nieuwenhuis et al. (2001) using the
AST, the ERN did not differ between aware and unaware
errors, whereas the Pe was present only for aware errors.
This result has been replicated numerous times with ocu-
lomotor tasks and the manual EAT for visual and auditory
stimuli (Endrass et al. 2005, 2007; O’Connell et al. 2007;
Shalgi et al. 2009). This has led to the interpretation that
the ERN is a preconscious correlate of performance mon-
itoring, whereas the Pe is a more likely correlate of error
awareness (Overbeek et al. 2005).
Neuroimaging studies hint at a role for the AIC, the
RCZ, and somatosensory cortex (SI, SII) in error awareness
(Hester et al. 2005; Klein et al. 2007). The findings suggest
that the RCZ and the AIC, respectively, show a modulation
by error blindness and error awareness reminiscent of the
patterns observed for the ERN and the Pe, respectively.
AIC and adjacent orbitofrontal/frontoopercular cortex has
been found to be engaged selectively to aware errors,
whereas the error-related RZC activity shows no significant
difference between unaware and aware errors (Hester et al.
2005; Klein et al. 2007). In contrast to the direct role of the
pMFC in generating the electrophysiological signal cap-
tured in the ERN (Debener et al. 2005), Klein et al. (2007)
deemed it implausible that the AIC is the immediate gen-
erator of the widely distributed fronto-parietal Pe. They
suggested that AIC might be involved more indirectly in
generating the Pe through its functional connections with
frontal and parietal cortices. Interestingly, Hester et al.
(2005) found parietal somatosensory areas more active for
aware than for unaware errors and speculated that these
1 Error monitoring is likely to be organized hierarchically and to
occur at many levels of the central nervous system. It appears that
errors that interfere with achievement of rewards and abstract high-
level goals are processed by the pMFC-centered performance
monitoring system, independently of stimulus and effector modality.
More low-level motor deviations and adjustments seem to be more
related to posterior cortical and subcortical motor control areas [e.g.,
posterior parietal cortex and cerebellum, for manual responses
(Desmurget et al. 1999; Krigolson et al. 2008)]. As action execution
and on-line motor control networks differ considerably between
manual and oculomotor actions, it is likely that the influence of
efference copies and proprioceptive feedback from these ‘‘low level’’
systems on the pMFC-centered ‘‘high-level’’ performance monitoring
system and the structures underlying error awareness differ as well.
634 Brain Struct Funct (2010) 214:629–643
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regions may contribute to Pe generation. As of yet, how-
ever, no concurrent ERP and fMRI data are available to put
these hypotheses to a test.
Thus, it is yet unclear how AIC, RCZ and somatosen-
sory cortex relate to each other during error awareness.
They may simply co-activate, however the rich anatomical
connections of AIC with the anterior cingulate cortex and
pMFC and with somatosensory cortex (Augustine 1996)
suggest functionally coordinated activity among these key
players.
Note that in some studies modulations of the ERN and
RCZ activity by error awareness was found (Maier et al.
2008; Harsay et al. 2010; Wessel et al. 2010), which con-
trasts with the common notion that the preconscious early
correlates of error processing are not related to error
awareness. However, as shown in Fig. 1a, it is not
implausible that error awareness is modulated by factors
that take effect already prior to error-related pMFC activity
and may thus influence these early correlates as well
(Fig. 1a). The discordant findings regarding ERN modu-
lation may relate to statistical power. Almost all reported
studies have very small sample sizes, increasing the type-
II-error probability. This is especially true given the small
amplitudes of the ERN in those paradigms.
In a number of studies, error awareness was associ-
ated with stronger post-error adjustments such as post-
error slowing or post-error improvement of accuracy
(Nieuwenhuis et al. 2001; Klein et al. 2007). Note that
in the EAT with widely spaced NoGo trials perfor-
mance adjustment is reflected in speeding on subsequent
trials; accordingly aware but not unaware errors were
followed by post-error speeding (Hester et al. 2005). It
is also conceivable that other trial-by-trial and long-
term post-error adjustments and maladjustments may be
influenced by error awareness, for example, in task
switching (Steinhauser and Hubner 2008) and errorful
learning.
Pathologic alterations of error awareness in autism,
ADHD and addiction have been observed and suggested
to relate to both hypo- and hyper-activity of AIC (Paulus
and Stein 2006; Hester et al. 2007; Silani et al. 2008;
Vlamings et al. 2008; O’Connell et al. 2009b; Paulus and
Stein 2010, this issue). In a group of patients with focal
lesions of the thalamus we found significantly impaired
error awareness in a flanker task (signaling rate, patients,
39.1 vs. controls 85.1%) accompanied by amplitude
reduction of the ERN and Pe (Seifert et al. 2010).
However, the majority of patient studies published so far
did not address error awareness directly. Given the
putative relationship of error awareness and some post-
error adjustments, error awareness research in patients
with neuropsychological deficits in cognitive control and
flexible adjustments is needed.
Autonomic nervous correlates of error awareness
The finding of the differential role of the AIC in neuro-
imaging experiments of error processing and error aware-
ness is of particular interest, given the evidence of the
AIC’s association with autonomic signals of the body
periphery (Craig 2002, 2009). Autonomic responses pre-
pare the organism to respond to changed internal and
external requirements and to recruit the necessary mental
as well as physical efforts. Thus, they occur as adjustments
to errors and external events (e.g., pain; Paine et al. 2009),
and they accompany numerous cognitive tasks already in
the preparatory phase.
The autonomic nervous system (ANS) has been shown
to be sensitive to errors on many accounts. One of the most
regularly reported ANS correlates sensitive to performance
accuracy is heart-rate (HR) variability measured by means
of electrocardiography (ECG). As early as in 1971, heart
rate has been shown to decelerate as a consequence of error
commission (Danev and de Winter 1971). This effect has
been replicated many times in the following decades
(Crone et al. 2003; Hajcak et al. 2003; Fiehler et al. 2004;
van der Veen et al. 2004; Wessel et al. 2010) and can be
seen as the most reliable known ANS correlate of error
processing. Furthermore, pupil diameter (PD), an index of
autonomic arousal with faster latencies than heart-rate
deceleration, has been investigated in relation to action
accuracy. Pupil dilation subsequent to the offset of the
(contractory) pupillary light reflex (evoked by the onset of
a luminant imperative stimulus) has been shown to be
enlarged in case the stimulus has led to an error (Critchley
et al. 2005a). Importantly, in this study, these PD changes
indexing autonomic arousal were correlated with activity in
both the AIC and the pMFC (amongst other brain areas) by
means of an fMRI conjunction analysis, suggesting a
possible link between AIC activation and autonomic
activity during error processing.
However, none of these studies have explicitly paid
attention to the question of error awareness, allowing no
immediate insights into the question of why the AIC should
be significantly more active on consciously perceived errors.
Recently, there have been two studies focusing on exactly
this question: Does the ANS reaction differ depending on
subjective error awareness? In a first experiment, using the
EAT, O’Connell and colleagues were able to demonstrate
that the skin-conductance response (SCR) to subjects’
reactions, another correlate of (mostly sympathetic) ANS
activity, is highly sensitive to subjective error awareness:
The SCR was enlarged towards errors (in comparison to
corrects), yet this only held true for consciously perceived
errors. Unperceived errors did, in fact, not yield any signif-
icant SCR at all whereas correct trials did, to lesser extend
than perceived errors (O’Connell et al. 2007).
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In a later study, using the AST, we contrasted both
heart-rate deceleration and pupil diameter with respect to
error awareness (Wessel et al. 2010). We found that the
well-established post-error heart-rate deceleration is indeed
only present on consciously perceived errors, paralleling
the results by O’Connell et al. (2007) for electrodermal
activity. For PD, a more complex finding ensued.
Extending earlier studies on stimulus-related pupillary
changes (Critchley et al. 2005a), we focused on response-
locked PD, showing that it is sensitive to performance
(accuracy) already in very early latency ranges (immedi-
ately subsequent to the response saccade), yet this mea-
surement is only in later latency ranges modulated by error
awareness. The very early difference between errors and
corrects gives rise to speculations about the role of neu-
ronal systems associated with PD already in pre-error
processes, leading to or influencing error commission.
Pupil diameter is regulated complementarily via the
interplay between the sympathetic and parasympathetic
branches of the ANS: Agonistic pupillary dilation is con-
trolled by the sympathetic branch via the ciliospinal center.
It projects to the superior cervical ganglion, from which
fibers (along the truncus sympathicus) project directly to the
pupil dilator muscle. Agonistic pupillary constriction is
parasympathetically regulated via (pretectal) inputs to the
nucleus Edinger–Westphal (nucleus accessorius nervi
occulomotorii). Efferences of this nucleus reach the iris
sphincter muscle by means of the ciliary ganglion. Pupil
diameter is regulated by an interaction of the two pathways,
and, in effect, by synergetic effects of both the dilator and
sphincter muscles of the iris (Qiyuan et al. 1985).
The putative role of norepinephrine in post-error CNS
and ANS responses
Although the exact neurophysiological underpinnings are
not yet fully understood, it has been argued that pupil
diameter responsivity constitutes an indirect index for the
locus coeruleus–norepinephrine (LC/NE) function (Gil-
zenrat et al. 2010). The LC is the main norepinephrine-
generating nucleus in the brainstem, and is central to reg-
ulating the sympathetic discharge and the inhibition of
parasympathetic tone in arousal responses. Fluctuations in
tonic and phasic LC firing modes have been found to index
variability in performance efficiency that can be linked to
lapses of task engagement in rodents (Usher et al. 1999;
Rajkowski et al. 2004). Thus, recently it has been
hypothesized that the LC/NE plays a role in higher-order
cognitive functioning and task engagement (Aston-Jones
and Cohen 2005). Phasic increases in firing have been
proposed to be associated with unexpected events eliciting
unexpected uncertainty (Yu and Dayan 2005; Dayan and
Yu 2006), which by itself seems to involve, among other
brain regions, the AIC. Notably, the LC has been argued to
be anatomically connected with the AIC (among other
frontal structures) (Aston-Jones et al. 1986, 1991). Based
on these anatomical connections it has been suggested that
signals from frontal structures (including AIC) vary with
LC firing and interestingly, pupil responsivity. Studies of
pupil diameter responses during cognitive control tasks
show that baseline pupil diameter (before a stimulus) and
evoked pupil diameter (after a stimulus) may serve as
indices for tonic and phasic modes of LC/NE function
(Gilzenrat et al. 2010). Larger baseline pupil diameter
before a task-relevant event and reduced task-evoked pupil
dilations thus may provide overt indications of task dis-
engagement and poorer performance.
In a recent fMRI experiment, we found that baseline PD
did indeed predict subsequent activity in areas previously
found to be associated with error awareness (Harsay et al.
2010). Specifically, PD prior to and after aware errors co-
varied with activity increases in the pMFC, AIC, somato-
sensory cortex and oculomotor areas, and the concurrent
deactivation in the default mode network (DMN) (Fig. 4).
Taken together, many different measures of ANS
activity have been shown to be differentially sensitive
towards error awareness and error blindness. Importantly,
these indices of ANS have earlier been demonstrated to be
associated with activity in both the RCZ and the AIC
(Critchley et al. 2005a, b; Medford and Critchley 2010, this
issue). Possible consequences of this association for the
role of the AIC in emerging error awareness are discussed
in the following section.
A perspective on integrating the AIC, the ANS,
and error awareness: the orienting response account
Alongside the AICs role in performance monitoring, a great
deal of evidence has been provided implicating it as a
correlate of autonomic nervous system (ANS) activity,
ranging from heart beat to indices of pupil diameter (Craig
2002, 2009; Critchley 2005). It is far from clear, however,
what precise association the AIC and the ANS share. Some
authors that have reported such associations primarily
attribute the role of insular activity to the process of the
generation of autonomic activity, whereas others emphasize
a possible key role of the insula in the perception, rather
than the generation, of ANS state and responses. Due to the
correlative nature of most neuroimaging techniques, causal
ties are hard to establish without the use of patient studies.
As a least common denominator, it seems safe to say,
though, that there is a reliable association between the
activity of large parts of the ANS and the AIC. As reported
earlier, erroneous actions are accompanied by changes in
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ongoing ANS activity, among reflected in HR, PD, and
SCR. Importantly, the response of the ANS is stronger for
perceived than for unperceived errors.
Accounts trying to explain the involvement of the ANS
in error processing have not always provided clear expla-
nations of the role of the ANS engagement as a conse-
quence of errors. In our aforementioned EEG-ANS study
(Wessel et al. 2010) we interpret our results in the light of
recent behavioral experiments (Notebaert et al. 2009),
which suggested strong behavioral parallels between pro-
cessing of errors and other rare, potentially significant
events (e.g., deviant and/or novel stimuli). According to
their account, error-related ANS activity is a manifestation
of an orienting response (OR, Sokolov 1963) towards an
erroneous outcome. The OR is a reflex-like reaction of the
organism to improbable changes in its environment (which
are potentially motivationally relevant) and is accompanied
by a cascade of CNS and ANS reactions, including HR,
PD, and SCR associated with increased arousal. We are
aware that the term orienting has been used in many con-
texts and use it here to indicate the complex arousal
response to motivationally salient events rather than ori-
enting attention in space or time. Such OR-related
interpretations of error-related ANS activity have been
provided already in the 1970s of the twentieth century
(Danev and de Winter 1971), but have not been followed
up on in later studies demonstrating ANS activity as a
consequence of errors.
The central argument is that an error, much like a rare
stimulus, elicits an OR-like reaction. The emergence of an
OR towards an infrequent stimulus is heavily dependent on
the realization of the potential significance (information
content) of the stimulus. For an error to elicit an OR, then,
it is reasonable to assume that the emergence of the OR
after an error is also associated with its detection. That is,
error awareness should be crucial to the emergence of an
error-related OR, or vice versa. The larger OR-like ANS
activity after perceived errors seems to support this
account. Moreover, there are striking parallels between the
association of the Pe with error awareness and the associ-
ation of the P3b with the OR (Ridderinkhof et al. 2009).
Notably, the P3b has been suggested to be related to phasic
activity of the LC/NE system (Nieuwenhuis et al. 2005), as
has the OR. The autonomic response to an error may serve
to increase autonomic arousal and thus facilitate necessary
adjustments. Note that strong responses and associated
Fig. 4 Pupil diameter just prior to errors predicts opposing neural
network dynamics that are supported by changes in functional
connectivity of anterior insular cortex (AIC), but only when subjects
become aware of the error (adapted from Harsay et al. 2010).
Preparatory pupil diameter predicts increased activation of AIC and
salience/control structures (RCZ rostral cingulate zone, S primary
sensory cortex, and task control oculomotor structures IPS intraparietal
sulcus, FEF frontal eye field) and decreased activation in the default
mode network (aMPFC anterior medial prefrontal cortex, and
PCC posterior cingulate cortex). Likewise, preparatory pupil diameter
predicts functional connectivity of AIC with nodes of the attention/
control networks (S, IPS) increased at the expense of functional
connectivity with nodes of the default mode network (aMPFC)
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arousal may also lead to maladaptation. For example, post-
error slowing [suggested to be at least in part driven by the
OR (Notebaert et al. 2009)] may be associated with
improvements in accuracy (=adaptive) or with decreases
in accuracy (=maladaptive) (Rabbitt 1966; Rabbitt and
Rodgers 1977; Fiehler et al. 2005). It may be speculated
that the adaptiveness of the adjustment depends not only
on external factors such as time pressure but also on the
pre-trial baseline state of the LC/NE system (see above).
Independently of the arguments as to why the ANS
response is different for perceived and unperceived errors,
this mere observational fact alone offers a simple possible
explanation for the differential effects of error awareness on
AIC activity: if the anterior insula serves either as an active
agent in eliciting the ANS response, or as a crucial monitor
for the milieu interne (on a proprioceptive/interoceptive
level with regard to ANS activity) of the body, the effects of
error awareness and error blindness on insular activity
might be the same that are responsible for the effects of
error awareness on the ANS. As already discussed in Klein
et al. (2007), it is unclear whether (a) AIC activity precedes
and causes the ANS response, (b) the ANS response elicits
the AIC engagement by interoception, or (c) both occur
simultaneously. In other words, it is of great interest whe-
ther AIC activity is causal to the ANS activity (and possibly
to components of the OR) or whether it serves more for
monitoring or interoceptive awareness-related functions. In
consequence, it is also of large interest whether the presence
of the ANS reaction itself is a mere consequence of error
awareness or whether it provides additional input for
potential other systems decisive for the conscious recogni-
tion of erroneous actions (see Fig. 1b). This, however, once
again underlines the need for lesion studies to establish a
causal relationship and its directionality.
The AIC as part of a ‘‘salience network’’
During performance across tasks as well as during rest and
rumination, the AIC has been argued to regulate competi-
tive dynamics between large-scale networks (Sridharan
et al. 2008). Functional connectivity studies suggest the
existence of several large-scale networks that appear to
underlie different task-related and task-unrelated functions
(Dosenbach et al. 2006, 2007; Nelson et al. 2010, this
issue). While the functional concepts regarding these net-
works are still rather vague and the engagement of certain
brain regions varies in a task-specific manner, three major
and relatively invariant networks seem to emerge: the
default mode network (DMN) typically most active during
rest and deactivated during cognitive effort, a fronto-pari-
etal ‘‘control network’’ assumed to be engaged in top–down
shifts of attention, and a ‘‘salience network’’ encompassing
the pMFC, bilateral AIC and the adjacent frontal opercu-
lum/orbitofrontal cortex (Seeley et al. 2007). This putative
salience network strongly overlaps with activity patterns
found in performance monitoring research (see metaanal-
ysis reported above and in Klein et al. (2007)). Interest-
ingly, it is strongly connected to the LC/NE system
(Aston-Jones et al. 1986, 1991). Phasic NE release has
been proposed to act as an interrupt signal (Dayan and Yu
2006) allowing to (re-)orient to any kind of upcoming
salient event and thus to flexibly react to unexpected
problems. Functionally, activation of structures of the
salience network has been associated with the processing
of personally and motivationally important ‘‘salient’’
information, in the broad spectrum of nociceptive (Peyron
et al. 2000), emotional and social (Bartels and Zeki 2004;
Singer et al. 2004; Lamm and Singer 2010, this issue),
cognitive (Ramautar et al. 2006), homeostatic and sympa-
thetic efferent and interoceptive autonomic domains (Craig
2002, 2003; Critchley 2004; Critchley et al. 2000, 2005a, b).
The salience network appears to be central to monitoring
for motivationally important changes that require auto-
nomic regulation (Downar et al. 2000, 2002, 2003). Inter-
estingly, the pattern of differential network activation,
perhaps reflecting a direct competition for processing
resources, has been found to be predictive for variability in
performance (Kelly et al. 2008). Tendencies toward
improved performance appear to be foreshadowed in the
activation of the salience and task-related control networks,
whereas increased activation in the DMN often presage
performance lapses (Weissman et al. 2006; Boly et al.
2007; Eichele et al. 2008). That the AIC might be involved
in these performance fluctuations in terms of preparatory
engagement (e.g., through the allocation of cognitive and
physical resources) of salience processing and deliberate
adaptive control networks while simultaneously disengag-
ing the DMN (Sridharan et al. 2008).
Similarly, the AIC and the salience network may help
recruiting cognitive and physical effort reactively, in
response to an error, or more generally, to OR. Initial
evidence for this hypothesis comes from a recent analysis
of the functional connectivity of AIC during error aware-
ness in the previously described AST (Harsay et al. 2010).
AIC displayed increased functional connections with
(other) salience network structures (primary somatosensory
cortex) and with oculomotor areas (intraparietal sulcus)
during error awareness, suggesting coordinated activity of
AIC with distant brain regions presumably in an effort to
amplify the neural salience-signal of the detected error and
to preset task-relevant oculomotor structures. Interestingly,
the functional connectivity of AIC varied with individual’s
baseline pupil dilation before the aware error. Pupil dila-
tion before the aware error predicted increased connectivity
with primary somatosensory cortex and oculomotor areas,
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together with decreased functional connectivity of AIC
with areas of the DMN (anterior medial frontal cortex,
frontal pole). Thus, the autonomic activity before the aware
error seems to translate centrally into an enhanced neural
control state during error awareness that is characterized by
inverse connectivity-patterns of AIC.
A potential limitation of the salience network account is
that there is little that seems to differentiate the roles of the
pMFC and the AIC. In fact, except for the differential
responsivity to error awareness (Hester et al. 2005; Klein
et al. 2007) we know of only one neuroimaging study on
performance monitoring in which AIC and pMFC activity
are dissociated (Magno et al. 2006). Here, the AIC and
pMFC are again coactivated on errors. However, when
subjects avoided trials associated with strong effort and
high error likelihood by pressing an ‘‘escape’’ button, only
the pMFC was active, whereas the insula showed no signal
change. Human and animal research indicate that the
pMFC is involved in cost–benefit calculations related to
whether or not it is worth taking effort for a certain reward
(Walton et al. 2003, 2007; Croxson et al. 2009; Hauber and
Sommer 2009). Reconciling the findings by Magno et al.
(2006) with these results it appears that pMFC activity is
associated with deciding about taking effort whereas the
AIC activity is associated with recruiting the resources
needed for mental and physical efforts (Deary et al. 2004;
Jansma et al. 2007; Eichele et al. 2008; see also Sterzer and
Kleinschmidt 2010, this issue). These hypotheses should be
tested in future experiments.
Discussion and outlook
To summarize, error awareness is a difficult-to-study phe-
nomenon that is of high interest as it may substantially
modify flexible adjustments, in particular the recruitment
of resources for effortful behavior and long-term strategy
changes. Error awareness certainly impacts general moti-
vation and affective responses to one’s own performance. It
appears to result when a compound error signal emerges
from numerous inputs (Fig. 1a). The weighting and timing
of these inputs determines the time when errors become
consciously perceived.
Regarding the neural correlates we are still at the very
beginning of this research. The RCZ, AIC, and somato-
sensory cortex appear to be the most relevant structures.
Error awareness is clearly associated with the occurrence
of the Pe and autonomic responses at a latency of 300 ms
and later. In contrast, earlier correlates of performance
monitoring such as the ERN and baseline changes in ANS
activity may vary with and even predict error awareness
but are unlikely to reflect the entry of the error signal into
consciousness.
The AIC and its relation to the autonomic response
appear to be crucial for error awareness. Their exact causal
interactions, however, are yet to be determined. Errors may
elicit an OR, associated with burst firing of LC neurons and
release of NE. It may be speculated that the OR is a pre-
requisite of error awareness as it increases arousal and
recruits large-scale brain networks sufficient to cause
conscious experience (Dehaene et al. 2006). In other
words, instead of actually becoming aware of the error
itself, we first may become aware of the OR. Furthermore,
it may be hypothesized that the AIC and pMFC as mem-
bers of a salience network are well-connected key players
in regulating the allocation of mental and physical effort
prior to important tasks and in response to unexpected
action outcomes. Recent functional connectivity studies
seem to suggest that this salience network is crucial for
balancing the engagement of task-related, rest-related
activity and ongoing activity in the human brain. In any
case, we should always keep in mind that cognitive and
autonomic responses are coupled in order to allow optimal
and most flexible adjustments; and the AIC and pMFC
appear to mediate this coupling.
A number of open questions remain to be addressed:
1. Is there any causal relationship between AIC activity,
autonomic responses, and error awareness? If yes,
what is the directionality of the causal interactions? To
address these questions, the autonomic responses to
errors and error awareness in patients and non-human
primates with focal insular lesions should be exam-
ined. Also invasive electrophysiology (e.g., in the
context of epilepsy diagnostics with depth electrodes)
could provide valuable information.
2. Is there any functional subregionalization of the AIC?
If yes, what are the functional principles and anatom-
ical underpinnings of this spatial differentiation? It
appears that more superior AIC activity occurs in sit-
uations when risks and failures can still be avoided,
whereas the inferior AIC is involved when a negative
event (error, increase in risk) has already occurred.
These situations may call for different types of
responses and require the recruitment of different
resources. Diffusion-weighted tractography studies
should focus on the differential connectivities of the
putative superior and inferior AIC subregions, specif-
ically with respect to other brain structures involved in
performance monitoring. This may provide hints on
the functional significance of the observed subregional
activity differences.
3. How much is error awareness related to awareness of
response conflict, decision uncertainty or generally
‘‘difficulty’’ and the effort one is willing to put into a
task? So far, no study has investigated whether
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response conflict—according to dominant theories one
of the major forces in recruiting cognitive effort
(Botvinick et al. 2001, 2004; Ridderinkhof et al. 2004;
Botvinick 2007)—becomes aware and whether such
‘‘conflict awareness’’ is needed for typical conflict-
driven adjustments (Egner and Hirsch 2005; Ullsper-
ger et al. 2005). Perhaps, a unifying concept could be
that these kinds of awareness relate to salient, moti-
vationally relevant, information-laden conditions, call-
ing for adjustments. They may already lead to some
adjustments in the absence of awareness, but the
stronger the signals and the accompanying autonomic
response, the more likely they enter awareness. The
orienting response may be at the top level of these
responses.
4. What is the relationship of uncertainty, LC/NE func-
tion, and AIC activity? While phasic NE release seems
associated with unexpected uncertainty (Dayan and Yu
2006), and the AIC has been shown to be involved in
uncertainty processing, it remains to be determined
when and how uncertainty changes in relation to errors.
Detecting errors may reduce uncertainty and thus help
learning to choose favorable actions and to avoid
unfavorable actions, new uncertainties may arise at the
same time. To choose appropriate remedial actions and
subsequent performance adjustments it is helpful to
determine the cause of the failure to reach the goal in the
first place. Uncertainty about the source of an error and
the appropriate adjustment has been shown to increase
pMFC and AIC activity (Ullsperger et al. 2007).
5. Which post-error adjustments depend on error aware-
ness, and which do not? Is error awareness an all-or-
nothing prerequisite for some adjustments, or is there a
gradual correlation of the adjustments with the strength
of the error signal resulting in awareness?
6. What are the interactions between error awareness and
emotion and motivation? Particularly aware errors
should have impact on motivation. Vice versa, affec-
tive and motivational state may influence to what
extent errors are consciously perceived.
7. Which patient groups have difficulties with error
awareness? What is the problem with patients who
become aware of their errors but still cannot implement
necessary strategy changes (thereby exhibiting know-
ing–doing dissociations)? In a number of brain diseases,
for example, in diffuse axonal injury resulting from
traumatic brain injury and in frontotemporal dementia,
patients are not aware of inappropriate behavior. To
what extent is their pathology related to the processes
involved in error awareness as reviewed here?
The research on how we become aware of our own
performance is still in its infancy. It is an important and
fascinating topic. The ultimate goal of this research with
respect to the function of the AIC should be to come up
with a general concept that also takes into account the
numerous other conditions engaging AIC as discussed in
this special issue.
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